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Abstract: We estimate the impact of international child sponsorship on adult income and wealth 
of formerly sponsored children using data on 10,144 individuals in six countries. To identify 
causal effects, we utilize an age-eligibility rule followed from 1980 to 1992 that limited 
sponsorship to children 12 years old or younger when the program was introduced in a village, 
allowing comparisons of sponsored children with older siblings who were slightly too old to be 
sponsored.  Estimations indicate that international child sponsorship raised monthly income by 
approximately $15 over an untreated baseline of $75, principally from increasing future labor 
market participation.  Formerly sponsored boys become more likely to have careers as teachers, 
tech workers, and hold salaried blue collar jobs as adults.  Formerly sponsored girls are also 
more likely to enter the labor market, particularly as clerical workers, nurses, tech workers, and 
in careers in finance and business. We find evidence for positive impacts on overall dwelling 
quality in adulthood, sponsorship causing a 3 percentage point increase in the probability of 
living in a home with electricity.  Sponsorship also significantly increases the probability of 
living in a rented or owned home independently from parents as an adult. Our results show 
modest evidence of impacts on adult ownership of consumer durables, mainly limited to increased 
ownership of mobile phones. Finally, we find modest effects of child sponsorship on reduced 
childbearing in adulthood, but insignificant impacts on age of marriage. 
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1. Introduction 
Millions of households in wealthy countries support non-profit organizations whose aim is to 
alleviate poverty in the developing world. But only recently has a growing body of research in 
development economics begun to rigorously evaluate the impact of these programs on their 
intended beneficiaries.1  International child sponsorship is one of the most popular approaches taken 
by ordinary households in wealthy countries to help impoverished children overseas. We estimate 
that there are currently 9.14 million sponsored children in the world today, the vast majority of 
whom are sponsored by individuals and families in wealthy countries.2  Donors typically contribute 
$25-40 per month to sponsor a child. In many cases child sponsorship organizations use these funds 
to provide school uniforms, tuition, nutritious meals, and programming that directly benefits 
sponsored children. Other types of sponsorship programs pool funds to invest in programming and 
infrastructure that benefits children in the community more broadly.3 
 For many individuals, child sponsorship represents their most direct contact with the poor 
in developing countries. Donors are drawn to child sponsorship because of the personalization of the 
relationship between sponsor and child.  But whether child sponsorship actually benefits sponsored 
children has remained an open question.  In Wydick, Glewwe, and Rutledge (2013), a companion 
paper to this research, we find international child sponsorship to have a statistically significant and 
positive effect on educational outcomes in all six survey countries (Bolivia, Guatemala, Kenya, 
Uganda, India, and the Philippines). Sponsorship during childhood increased the probability of 
secondary school completion by 12-18 percentage points over a 44.5% baseline, and increased 
completed years of schooling by 1.03-1.45 years. Sponsorship also increased adult white-collar 
employment by 6.5 percentage points over an 18.5% baseline as well as the probability of being a 
community leader.  
Previous research has studied the impacts of various programs on children’s persistence in 
school in developing countries.  Examples include Drèze and Kingdon (2001) and Kremer and 
Vermeersch (2004) who find positive impacts of school meal programs on school attendance in India 
                                                          
1 See for example Cristia et al. (2012) evaluating the One Laptop Per Child Program, Rawlins et al. (2014) on the 
nutritional impacts of dairy cows and meat goats donated via the Heifer Project, and the analysis of Blattman et al. 
(2014) on cash transfers. 
2
 We estimate this figure based on comprehensive internet search across multiple languages for sponsorship programs.  
For details on how the 9.12 million figure was compiled, see Wydick, Glewwe, and Rutledge (2013).  
3 Of the top ten child sponsorship organizations, a more direct child-centered approach is taken by Compassion 
International, ChildFund, Children International, CFCA, and Bornefonden.  The community-centered approach is 
favored by World Vision, Plan International, Kindernothilfe, Save the Children, and SOS Children’s Villages. 
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and Kenya, respectively.  In a randomized trial, Evans, Kremer and Ngatia (2008) find a nearly 40% 
reduction in absenteeism from the random provision of free school uniforms, while Kremer, Miguel, 
and Thornton (2009) estimate that a merit scholarship program for girls boosted attendance by 5 
percentage points.  Aside from our research, the only other investigation related to ascertaining the 
impacts of international child sponsorship is Kremer, Moulin, and Namunyu (2003).  In this paper 
the authors assess the impact of a Dutch child-sponsorship program, finding that even a relatively 
low-cost program focused on the provision of school uniforms and textbooks to each child caused 
sponsored children to advance a third of a grade farther in schooling completion. 
In this paper we present results for the impacts of child sponsorship on the adult income4 
and wealth of children sponsored through one of the leading international child sponsorship 
organizations. An understanding of these impacts is important for the millions of individuals in 
wealthy countries involved in international child sponsorship, individuals who are likely to view 
their contributions as an investment in these overseas children that yields tangible economic 
returns in the future, when they are adults.  But it is also important for governments in countries 
implementing similar programs that work directly with impoverished children, helping them to 
understand whether direct investments in child development are financially sustainable by virtue of 
the positive impacts on the future incomes of beneficiaries.  Thus we ask the question: 
Does international child sponsorship pay off for children in adulthood? 
2. Methodology 
Fieldwork for our six-country study took place from 2008 to 2010. We obtained initial enrollment 
lists from village projects that were rolled out from 1980 to 1992 by Compassion International, the 
world’s third largest sponsorship organization, which currently sponsors approximately 1.4 million 
children in 26 countries.  Compassion’s child sponsorship program is a very intensive intervention 
in the lives of impoverished children.  Children typically begin sponsorship at age 4-6 and continue 
into their mid-teens.  Many sponsored children attend retreats together with program staff that 
focus on the nurture of their spiritual and moral values as well as their aspirations.  Since even in a 
typical week children typically spend about 8-10 hours per week after school and on Saturdays 
participating in the program, and because the average duration of sponsorship is 9.3 years, this 
                                                          
4
 Our study examines changes in labor income, which includes wages paid by an employer, income earned by an 
entrepreneur from a small enterprise, or income from farming.  We do not study income earned from capital holdings, 
as these were deemed to be insignificant for the great majority of the households in our sample.  In our study, the terms 
“labor income” and “wages” have a similar meaning but are not exactly the same; we use the term “wages” as conditional 
on working status and “labor income” in contexts that are unconditional on working status, e.g. labor income increases 
when one enters the workforce and begins to earn a wage. 
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means that during the course of their childhood, on average sponsored children spend slightly more 
than 4,000 hours participating in Compassion programming.  Average years of participation by 
country is given in Table 1. 
Across the countries in which it is implemented, the Compassion program contains many 
similar elements. In each country Compassion uses funding to provide tuition fees for children, 
several nutritious meals per week, basic healthcare, school uniforms, and an after-school tutoring 
program.  The tutoring program not only helps sponsored children with homework and gives them 
additional academic instruction, but emphasizes spiritual and character formation and the 
development of schooling and vocational aspirations and self-esteem.  Note that vocational training 
was not included in any of these six countries.   
The program has changed slightly since the time of the study and varies somewhat between 
countries. In the past, Compassion worked in tandem with local schools (which is true of our data 
from Guatemala and the Philippines) but more recently has operated through local church-affiliated 
tutoring centers. We study the impacts from children involved in the program in India and Bolivia 
when small cash transfers were given to parents of participating children, but not in other countries. 
Other than these differences the program across countries is highly standardized. 
 Through the use of local enumerators, we were able to locate 93.5% of the families of these 
formerly sponsored children, who by the time of the survey were aged 17 to 43. Our field personnel 
were unaffiliated with Compassion, in order to reduce bias in the responses of our subjects. We 
administered our survey first-hand to households of formerly sponsored children, a random sample 
of non-participating households in 19 program villages, and a random sample of households in 13 
neighboring, non-program villages. The survey questionnaire was administered to family members 
(typically parents or adult siblings) present at the time of the survey, and data were obtained on all 
grown siblings in the household cohort, including the non-sponsored siblings of sponsored children.  
We also administered the survey to 50-75 randomly selected households with children in a similar 
cohort age that did not participate in the program in program villages, as well as 50-75 randomly 
selected households with children in a similar cohort age in nearby non-program villages.  
Overall, our data contain information on educational and vocational outcomes, monthly 
labor income, consumer good ownership, and dwelling quality on 1,860 formerly sponsored 
children, 3,704 of their unsponsored siblings, 2,136 individuals of a similar age from non-
participating families in villages where the Compassion program operated, and 2,444 individuals 
from similar, nearby villages without the Compassion program.   
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There are several empirical challenges to estimating the program’s causal effects on future 
income and wealth. First, there may be non-random selection of households with eligible children 
into the program. Second, since a limited number of children per household were eligible for 
sponsorship (ranging from one in the African countries to three in the Latin American countries), 
intra-household selection of children for sponsorship may not be random.  Third, there may be 
spillover effects from sponsored children onto their siblings, or onto other children in the village, 
which complicates the estimation.  Lastly, when estimating impacts on future labor income, impacts 
on employment must be separated from impacts on wages, conditional on employment. 
To identify causal effects of child sponsorship, we use a program age-eligibility requirement, 
which stipulated that only children 12 and under could enter the program in any year, including the 
program’s first year in a village.  Figure 1 shows the program’s strong adherence to this rule.  
Because a child's age at the time of program rollout in his or her village is independent of adult life 
outcomes, except via its impact on program participation, we can use the age-eligibility rule as an 
instrumental variable that allows one to account (and test) for non-random intra-household 
selection of children for sponsorship.  To address possible endogenous household selection into the 
program, we present estimates with household fixed effects, which control for unobserved 
differences in parenting behavior and household environments.5 Implicitly, this compares life 
outcomes of children who were age-eligible for sponsorship with their siblings who were too old for 
sponsorship when the program arrived in their village.   
The regression estimates allow for the possibility of spillovers. Dummy variables are 
included for: (a) Sponsored children, who were 12 or younger when the program started in their 
villages (denoted by T = 1); (b) Program participants’ siblings who were 12 or younger when the 
program began in their villages and, while eligible, were not selected for sponsorship (denoted 𝐷1
≤12 
= 1); (c) Program participants’ siblings age 13-16 when the program arrived in their villages, and 
thus were ineligible (𝐷1
13−16 = 1); (d) Individuals in non-Compassion households in program 
villages who were 12 or younger at program introduction (𝐷2
≤12 = 1); (e) Individuals in non-
Compassion households in program villages age 13-16 at program introduction (𝐷2
13−16 = 1); 
(f) Individuals 12 or younger in non-Compassion villages when the program started in a 
neighboring village (𝐷3
≤12 = 1); and (g) Individuals 13-16 in non-Compassion villages when the 
                                                          
5
 We found that program staff usually selected households for participation, and then parents chose which children to be 
sponsored. 
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program began in a neighboring village (𝐷3
13−16 = 1). Individuals 17 or older in non-program 
villages are the omitted category.   
The household fixed-effects equation for child i in household j is 
𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼1𝐷1𝑖𝑗
≤12 + 𝛼2𝐷1𝑖𝑗
13−16 + 𝜏(𝐷1𝑖𝑗
≤12 ∗ 𝑇𝑖) + 𝛽1𝐷2𝑖𝑗
≤12 + 𝛽2𝐷2𝑖𝑗
13−16 
+ 𝛾1𝐷3𝑖𝑗
≤12 + 𝛾2𝐷3𝑖𝑗
13−16 + 𝑿𝒊𝒋𝝋 + 𝜃𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗   (1) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑗 measures labor income or wealth, 𝑿𝒊𝒋 is a vector of controls that include age, gender, birth 
order and oldest child, and  𝜃𝑗  is a household fixed effect. Assuming that spillovers: (a) occur only 
within villages; and (b) affect age-eligible, but not age-ineligible, siblings of sponsored children, then 
[𝛼1 − 𝛼2] − [𝛾1 − 𝛾2] captures spillovers from sponsored children onto non-sponsored siblings age 
12 and younger and [𝛽1 − 𝛽2] − [𝛾1 − 𝛾2] captures spillovers onto age-eligible children in non-
Compassion households in program villages.6  
To address possibly endogenous selection of age-eligible children within families we use 
instrumental variable  estimation.  The oldest age-eligible sibling was sponsored most often, 
followed by the second-oldest age-eligible sibling, third oldest, etc., so the instruments are 
interaction terms between three age-at-program-rollout categories (4 years and under, 5-8, 9-12) 
and dummy variables for oldest age-eligible sibling, second-oldest age-eligible sibling, and younger 
age-eligible siblings, yielding a vector of nine instruments.7  In the first stage, the probability of 
sponsorship, ?̂?𝑖, is estimated using these instruments and the vector of controls; ?̂?𝑖 replaces the 
treatment variable (𝑇𝑖) in (1) in a second-stage regression.  
Estimating the impact of sponsorship on monthly wages involves another challenge: wages 
are unobserved for the 61% in the sample who were not working.  This suggests the use of 
Heckman (1979) estimation for the wage impact regressions, which uses a probit employment 
equation to generate an Inverse Mills ratio for each observation in a second-stage wage regression. 
Given certain assumptions, this removes bias from the censored wage variable (the dependent 
variable in second equation).  
Using this approach allows us to decompose overall labor income impacts of child 
sponsorship into the impact from formerly sponsored children obtaining employment and the 
impact on wages conditional on employment.  These two effects are seen by differentiating the 
expected average wage, 𝐸(𝑤), where 
                                                          
6
 Spillovers onto non-sponsored siblings may reflect extra income available from sponsorship, role model effects, and 
parental reallocation of assistance to non-sponsored children. 
7 An identical set of instruments are used in Wydick et al. (2013). 
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 𝐸(𝑤) = Φ(𝒛′𝜸) ∙ 𝑤(𝒙′𝜷),      (2) 
and Φ(𝑧′𝛾) is the probability that an individual works and earns a wage, based on characteristics 𝒛, 
and 𝑤(𝒙′𝜷) is the individual’s wage, conditional on working, based on characteristics 𝒙. To estimate 
𝜷 without assuming arbitrary functional forms,  𝒛 should have one or more variables that are 
excluded from 𝒙; we use the individual’s number of children, which strongly affects the probability 
of employment but should have relatively little effect on wages.8 Both 𝒙 and 𝒛 include the 
sponsorship (treatment) variable, T. Differentiating (2) with respect to T, and setting variables to 
their means, gives  
   
𝜕𝐸(𝑤)
𝜕𝑇
 =
𝜕Φ(𝑧′𝛾)
𝜕𝑇
∙ 𝑤(?̅?′𝜷) +
𝜕𝑤
𝜕𝑇
∙ Φ(?̅?′𝜸)    (3) 
The first term gives the impact of sponsorship on income from its employment effect; the second is 
the impact of sponsorship on wages, conditional on employment.   
Both terms in (3) are obtained using Heckman’s method; Φ(𝑧′𝛾) is estimated using a probit 
specification, and 𝑤(𝒙′𝜷) is essentially equation (1).  To calculate the standard errors of the 
employment effect (the first term in (3)), a bootstrapping procedure is used; estimates of  
𝜕Φ(𝑧′𝛾)
𝜕𝑇
 and 
of the average wage are obtained from a random draw (with replacement) from the sample.  These 
two estimates are multiplied for each bootstrap iteration and (household-level clustered) standard 
errors are obtained from 500 bootstrapped replications.  Similarly, the impact of sponsorship on 
wages (the second term in (3)) is the product of the estimate of  
𝜕𝑤
𝜕𝑇
 and mean labor market 
participation; for each bootstrapped sample (with replacement), the entire estimation procedure, 
which combines estimates of the probit equation with those of the wage equation, is implemented, 
and 500 bootstrap replications are used to obtain standard errors. 
 For all 10,144 individuals in the study, interviewers attempted to obtain current labor 
income, which in our use of the term covers fixed wages paid by an employer, itinerate wages, 
estimated monthly income from a small business, or income from farming; all of this we refer to as 
wages.  We did not collect data on non-labor income (such as returns on assets), which were 
                                                          
8
 It is possible that there are unobserved characteristics that reduce individuals’ wages and also influence their fertility 
(e.g. tastes for children, or lower labor productivity, which reduces the opportunity cost of raising children).  This could 
cause the error term in the wage equation to be correlated with the number of children, invalidating number of children 
as an identifying variable in the selection equation.  This seems unlikely for men, but it may occur for women.  To check 
the robustness of our results, we tried two alternative approaches.  First, we used “electrified household” as the excluded 
variable. Such households are more likely to be near labor markets, so that individuals in them are more likely to be 
employed, but it is unlikely that this variable directly affects wages. Second, we used no exclusion restriction and thus 
relied on the assumed normality of the probit error term to identify our selection term. These two approaches yielded 
very similar results and thus suggest that our findings are robust to different exclusion restrictions.. 
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infrequently realized among the low-income households in our sample.  For 83% of those who were 
reported to be working for any wage at all, they or their family members reported the wages of the 
individual.  For the remaining 17% no one could provide a wage figure, but for nearly all of these 
individuals, family members knew their completed schooling and current occupation.  Using data on 
education, occupation, gender and age (and country fixed effects), labor income was imputed for all 
individuals in the sample.  Two estimates of labor income impacts from sponsorship were thus 
implemented; one drops the 17% of the sample without wage data, and the other imputes labor 
income values to all individuals in the sample, including those with observed wages.9  A hybrid in 
which we impute labor income only for missing observations yields estimates very similar to the 
latter estimates.  Assuming that any imputation errors are independent of the explanatory variables 
in equation (1), estimates using imputed values are consistent and unbiased (Wooldridge 2010, 
p.77).  To carry out estimations by country and gender we use the imputed labor income, which 
yield slightly lower (yet more precise) impact estimates than do our directly reported wage data. 
To examine the impact of child sponsorship on adult wealth, we examine two broad 
categories: indicators of current dwelling quality, and current ownership of common consumer 
durable goods and land. The dwelling quality measures include the presence of an indoor toilet, 
electricity, walls constructed of sturdy materials (e.g. wood or concrete, rather than mud or sticks), 
high quality roofs (constructed from tile, concrete, or high-quality wood, rather than thatch, leaves, 
or low-quality corrugated iron), and high quality floors (concrete, wood, or tile, rather than dirt 
floors or floors made from other natural materials). For the second wealth proxy, information was 
collected on ownership of mobile phones, bicycles, motorcycles, automobiles, and land. 
To address issues of over-testing and joint-testing of related hypotheses, two types of 
indices were created. The first simply weights each of the five variables within a group equally; OLS 
and GMM IV estimations are then carried out on these simple indices. Secondly, for each of these 
two groups of variables we created an Anderson (2008) summary index.  This index is created by 
de-meaning each of the dependent variables in the respective group j (j  dwelling, consumer 
goods), then weighting each observation by the sum of its row entries across the inverted variance-
covariance matrix of the dependent variables in the group. Specifically, each observation i in group j 
receives a weight (index score) of  ?̅?𝑖𝑗 = (1′𝛴
−11)−1(1′𝛴−1𝑦𝑖𝑗), where 1 is a m x 1 column vector of 
1’s, 𝛴−1 is the m x m inverted covariance matrix, and 𝑦𝑖𝑗 is the m x 1 vector of outcomes for 
individual i. Relative to the simple index, the Anderson Index gives more weight to dependent 
                                                          
9 The few individuals whose imputed wages are less than or equal to zero are assigned non-working status. 
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variables within the grouping that are least correlated with other variables, and hence embody the 
greatest degree of unique information. 
 
3. Results 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the data. Monthly labor income is $16.67 higher 
among those who were sponsored as children (p < 0.01).  This mainly reflects a higher employment 
rate (54.5% to 47.9%) among formerly sponsored individuals (p < 0.01).   This is evident in Figure 2; 
conditional on positive labor income, (log) income is only slightly higher conditional on positive 
income, but formerly sponsored individuals show far more positive labor income observations.10  
Figure 3 illustrates the program’s impact in a discontinuity diagram; non-parametric estimation 
shows that labor income is somewhat higher for individuals in untreated (relative to treated) 
households among those over age 12 when the program began.  However, among those 12 or 
younger when the program rolled out, income is clearly higher in treated households. 
A) Impact on Income 
The impacts of child sponsorship on adult labor income by current age are best seen visually.  
Figure 4 presents non-parametric estimations of the labor market income trajectories of sponsored 
(upper line) and unsponsored (lower line) individuals; the impact of sponsorship appears to increase 
over time (bandwidth = 1, Epanechnikov kernel).  While differences in income are small in the 
twenties and thirties, they grow substantially as individuals reach their forties, beyond which our 
data no longer contains observations of older formerly sponsored individuals.  
Heckman estimates of income impacts are provided in Table 3 in columns (1) through (12). 
The first row of Table 3 presents the marginal impacts of child sponsorship on the probability of 
working.  Column (1) gives estimates without household fixed effects and omits missing income 
observations, column (2) adds household fixed effects, column (3) uses household fixed effects with 
imputed labor income (and thus includes observations with missing income data), and columns (4), 
(5), and (6) provide bootstrapped IV-Heckman estimates that are analogous to the estimates in 
columns (1), (2) and (3). These estimates are from instrumental variable (IV) estimations in which 
we regress treatment on our vector of instruments and controls in the first stage and then carry out 
the Heckman estimation in the second stage, bootstrapping clustered standard errors at the 
household level for the entire process with 500 replications.  The first three columns yield estimated 
marginal effects of 0.096, 0.079, 0.068, for the first-stage (probit) estimations.  The second three 
                                                          
10 To show the density of incomes equal to zero, we specify log income as log(income + 1).  
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columns yield estimates of 0.116, 0.191, and 0.186 of the marginal effect of the program on employ-
ment.  All of the former are significant at p < 0.01, and the latter at p < 0.05 and p < 0.10.  While 
the IV estimates are higher than the estimates in columns (1) – (3), Hausman tests cannot reject the 
null hypothesis that the standard probit estimate is consistent (the lowest p-value is 0.136).   
The second row of Table 3 provides estimates of  
𝜕Φ(𝑧′𝛾)
𝜕𝑇
∙ 𝑤(?̅?′𝜷) in (3), the increased 
income from sponsorship via greater employment.  These impacts range from $12.81 per month in 
column (3) to $38.00 in column (5).  Because we cannot reject the consistency of the standard probit 
estimates (Hausman test t = 1.49), we emphasize the average impact in columns (1) to (3), which is 
$15.23.   
The third row provides second-stage (Heckman) estimates of  
𝜕𝑤
𝜕𝑇
, the impact of sponsorship 
on wages conditional on employment.11  Only the $6.06 estimate in column (3) is significant (p < 
0.05); although two of the three IV-Heckman estimates are much larger, they are very imprecise.  
Thus it is only over the whole sample (including observations with missing income data) that there 
is evidence that sponsorship raises incomes conditional upon employment, and when the income 
impacts in the third row are combined with the probability of employment in the fourth row, 
𝜕𝑤
𝜕𝑇
∙ Φ(?̅?′𝜸) , all estimates are insignificant except for the $2.64 estimate (p < 0.10) in column (3), 
although again two of the three IV point estimates are considerably larger.  Overall, these estimates 
are consistent with the density functions in Figure 2—the main impact of child sponsorship on 
income is primarily via increased employment, rather than via increased wages among those already 
employed.   
Columns (7) through (12) in Table 3 show impacts on income due to the increased 
probability of employment from child sponsorship, replicating the estimate in column (3) for each 
country.  Impacts are highest in India ($37.61, p < 0.01), Guatemala ($27.63, p < 0.05), and the 
Philippines ($17.01, p < 0.10).  And although estimates are positive in every country, they are lower 
and statistically insignificant in Bolivia ($8.19), Uganda ($7.19) and Kenya ($1.61).12   Joint tests for 
                                                          
11 The log of labor income is typically used such regressions, but in decomposing income effects from the Heckman 
equation between labor force entry and the marginal income increases contingent on employment, it becomes more 
convenient to use levels rather than logs.  Results using log income are similar, but this specification becomes very 
cumbersome analytically and yields little benefit. 
 
12
 Other estimation models yield similar estimates.  For example, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates for the full 
sample, including those who are not working, and over a variety of specifications, yield significant (p < 0.01) estimates 
ranging from $16.60 to $19.05.  While these OLS estimates capture both employment selection and marginal wage 
effects, they may be biased because they omit the Inverse Mills ratio, which is included in the Heckman estimation as a 
right-hand-side regressor. Tobit estimates, which are not preferred because they assume the impacts of the explanatory 
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differences across continents indicate significantly lower impacts in Africa than in Asia and Latin 
America, likely due to comparatively low economic opportunity in these two African countries.  
This is true even though educational impacts in our companion paper were found to be much 
stronger in the African countries. 
In Table 4 we split up our Heckman estimations by gender, and find that the monthly labor 
income effects from increase probability of employment are nearly identical in the (first-stage) 
standard probit estimations ($12.60 for men, $12.75 for women, both p < 0.01).  (These are 
equivalent to our estimates in column (3) of Table 3.)  IV estimates for both are larger, but 
insignificant.  There is a positive impact on wages conditional on employment for men ($6.74, p < 
0.01), but this effect is zero for women.  IV estimates of the marginal effect on men’s wages are very 
large, $33.15 and $53.08, but imprecisely measured.  All effects for the impact on the marginal wage 
for women are low and insignificant. Thus sponsorship yields an increase in girls’ future labor 
income of $12.75, resulting solely from greater labor market participation.  But the total impact 
from sponsorship on boys’ future labor income is $19.34--$12.60 from higher labor market 
participation and $6.74 from higher wages conditional upon labor market participation.     
We test for income spillovers onto unsponsored siblings and other children of eligible age 
within program villages using a joint test of the significance of the linear combinations  [𝛼1 − 𝛼2] −
[𝛾1 − 𝛾2] and [𝛽1 − 𝛽2] − [𝛾1 − 𝛾2] in (2), but find no evidence of either positive or negative 
spillover effects in either case (p = 0.987, 0.195, respectively).  Thus we conclude that the benefits of 
international sponsorship on adult income appear to be limited to the sponsored child. 
Figure 5 shows that the impacts on education appear to be smallest among both the least 
educated and most educated mothers of sponsored children. The largest difference in income 
between sponsored and non-sponsored children occurs among children of mothers with a primary 
school education, which is perhaps enough education to offer complementary support to the 
sponsorship program but not so much that the counterfactual levels of education for children would 
be high even without sponsorship. 
Because most of our impact on income is on the extensive margin (labor market 
participation) rather than the intensive margin (higher wages), one possibility is that child 
sponsorship simply encouraged individuals on the margin of labor market participation to move into 
the labor market.  Perhaps the sponsorship program merely raised aspirations for labor market 
activity rather than genuinely increasing the returns to labor market participation.  In this case, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
variables to be the same for the selection and marginal wage effects, yield significant (p < 0.01) estimates between 
$12.53 and $24.51. 
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income gains we show here might be only slightly higher than the opportunity cost from non-wage 
work such as raising children or subsistence farming.   
One way to test whether the income gains from child sponsorship truly increased income or 
simply substituted income for non-wage opportunity costs of similar value is to estimate the 
increase in labor market value of sponsorship via its impact on greater schooling completion.  In 
this sense we estimate the individual terms of 
𝜕𝐸(𝑤)
𝜕𝑇
 = [
𝜕Φ(𝑧′𝛾)
𝜕𝑠
∙ 𝑤(?̅?′𝜷) +
𝜕𝑤
𝜕𝑠
∙ Φ(?̅?′𝜸)]
𝜕𝑠
𝜕𝑇
,   (4) 
where s is schooling, which carries out the same estimation except measuring impacts via the impact 
of the program on added schooling completion. 
Schooling exhibits significant impacts on labor market participation and the number of 
children an individual has as an adult. Table 5 shows that each additional year of schooling 
increases labor market participation by 2.3 percentage points overall, 0.032 for women and 0.014 for 
men.  It also reduces the number of children (as shown in negative binomial estimations) in columns 
(4), (5), and (6) by -0.094 children for women per added year of education and by -0.054 for men. 
To check whether the program truly increased the financial returns to labor market 
participation via its impact on schooling we present results from a three-stage procedure in Table 6.  
In this table we jointly estimate the impact of child sponsorship on schooling (essentially replicating 
the results in our companion paper) through both OLS and GMM IV estimation. The second stage 
estimates a Heckman wage equation on the non-treated individuals in our sample as a function of 
total years of education and covariates, in which we obtain an estimate of the monthly income gains 
from an added year of schooling on the non-treated.  In the third stage, we multiply the impact 
coefficients from the first and second stages by the expected monthly wage, i.e. (sponsorship 
program impact on schooling)  (schooling impact on labor market participation)  (mean monthly 
labor market wage), to obtain the mean impact of child sponsorship on wages via its impact on 
schooling and the added value that additional years of schooling yield in the labor market, 
bootstrapping the entire process with 500 replications.  These estimates of the impact of the 
sponsorship program via the effects of education on labor market participation are given in the 
middle set of estimates in Table 6, and they show an increase in monthly wages for men between 
$3.54 and $6.56; the estimates for women lie between $3.83 and $6.21.   
The third row of estimations repeats this exercise for the income impact of the program via 
the higher wages the added schooling from the program yields conditional upon employment, i.e. 
(sponsorship program impact on schooling)  (schooling impact on marginal wage, conditional on 
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employment )  (probability of employment).  Estimates here range from $2.36 to $3.92 for men and 
from $4.11 to $8.37 for women.  The bottom row of the table shows the total income impacts that 
accrue to sponsored children simply via added education, $8.04 to $10.48 per month overall, a little 
higher for women, thus representing perhaps 2/3 of the impact of the program.  Notably, however, 
these estimates indicate a higher impact for women on the marginal wage conditional on 
employment than is actually realized in the program. This may be because young women who finish 
the program show high rates of entry into the labor market, but choose to undertake relatively low-
paid positions commensurate with the human service perspective of the program rather than a focus 
on higher adult incomes, where this message may have taken root more deeply among formerly 
sponsored women than among formerly sponsored men.  
In many instances the decision to enter the labor force is commensurate with other 
demographic decisions regarding, for example, marriage and childbearing. Figure 6 shows kernel 
densities of the number of children in the families of formerly sponsored and unsponsored 
individuals, now adults, where the diagram seems to indicate smaller families in adulthood among 
the formerly sponsored.  Although Figure 7 does not appear to show substantial differences in 
marriage rates over age by sponsorship status for either gender, Table 7 presents modest evidence 
that sponsorship may slightly reduce the probability of marriage.  Whereas in other estimations 
spillover effects to siblings were found to be insignificant, and so were omitted from our regression 
tables, here we find evidence of significant spillovers and therefore present results that account for 
spillover effects onto (younger) siblings.  We find very mild evidence that sponsorship causes a 
roughly 7 percentage point reduction in the probability of marriage at the time of the survey 
(p < 0.10) with effects reasonably uniform across age groups, perhaps having a slightly larger 
impact on marriage from age 17 to 21, although this is measured with noise.   
In the negative binomial estimations in columns (4) to (6) of Table 7 we see sponsorship 
yielding a small reduction in family size.  This table presents negative binomial estimation 
coefficients, but these magnitudes translate to marginal effects (accounting for spillovers) of 0.248 
children overall, and 0.64 fewer children for older sponsored children age 40-45 at the time of the 
survey, with lower point estimates for the younger adults.  The impacts on childbearing are likely 
greater on older individuals simply because birth rates were much higher when these individuals 
were sponsored back in the early 1980s, and so the impact of greater labor force entry has a 
stronger effect on birth rates. This can be seen in Figure 8, for example, where birth rates are only 
slightly lower for the formerly sponsored, but then fall considerably among the older cohort.  We 
do not present impacts by gender; they are virtually identical between men and women. 
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The increase in income from child sponsorship occurs through different career choices of 
formerly sponsored men and women. Table 8 presents multinomial logit estimates of the impacts of 
sponsorship on vocational trajectories, separately by gender.  Sponsorship of boys leads them in 
adulthood into two main types of jobs: K-12 teachers and employees in lower-skill technology jobs, 
such as work in call centers, with some evidence of an increase in blue-collar employment.  
Formerly sponsored men are roughly 62% more likely to be teachers in adulthood relative to the 
counterfactual and are about 44% more likely to have a semi-skilled technology job or work in a call 
center.  Sponsorship of girls makes them 50% less likely to be involved in agriculture as adults, 55% 
more likely to have a clerical job, 60% more likely to work in finance or for a large corporation, 
148% more likely to have a semi-skilled technology job (starting from a very low baseline), and 93% 
more likely to be a nurse or health professional.   
 
B) Wealth Impacts  
Finally, we consider the impact of child sponsorship on indicators of wealth in adulthood.  
Results show that individuals who were sponsored as children live in better houses as adults. Both 
the simple index and the Anderson index indicate significant impacts of sponsorship on adult 
dwelling quality.  Specifically, OLS (linear probability model) household fixed-effect estimates in 
Table 9 indicate that sponsorship  increases the probability that a home has electricity by 2.9 
percentage points, raises the probability of having improved walls by 2.5 percentage points, and 
increases having improved floors by 1.9 percentage points. GMM-IV estimates are smaller and 
insignificant for specific improvements, but larger and significant for both dwelling indices. 
Does child sponsorship increase consumer durable ownership in adulthood? The only asset 
with a statistically significant effect is the probability of owning a mobile phone, an increase of 5.4 
percentage points in the OLS estimate and 18.3 percentage points in the IV estimate (baseline of 
76.8%). We find no evidence that sponsorship increased ownership of bicycles, motorcycles, 
vehicles, or land; the IV coefficients on both consumer good summary indices are insignificant.   
Tests for household and village level spillovers show no significant effects on aggregated 
dwelling indicators (p = 0.237 and p = 0.523, respectively) or consumer durables (p = 0.333 and p = 
0.536).  Although our research on educational impacts provides evidence for spillovers onto younger 
siblings, particularly in secondary school completion (Wydick, Glewwe, and Rutledge, 2013), we 
find no evidence of income or wealth spillovers in our data. 
Tables 10 and 11 disaggregate wealth impact estimations by gender.  Not surprisingly, 
impacts on dwelling quality appear to be higher for formerly sponsored men than for women.  OLS 
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estimates for men are positive on every dwelling category--indoor toilet, electrification of the 
household, improved walls, improved roof, and improved floor--and statistically significant for 
every category except improved walls.  Both the simple dwelling index and the Anderson dwelling 
index are also strongly significant. However, IV estimates for men are all insignificant.  OLS 
estimates for women indicate that sponsorship appears to affect only the probability of living in a 
home with electricity, and even this is not significant for the IV estimates.  These differences in 
effects by gender presumably reflect the larger overall impact of sponsorship on the incomes of 
formerly sponsored men, and they may also reflect that a husband’s income has a stronger influence 
on the type of dwelling in adulthood. 
Impacts on consumer durables are virtually identical between formerly sponsored men and 
women, where estimations indicate a strong and significant impact on cell phone ownership for both 
genders, but no effect on ownership of a bicycle, motorcycle, car, or land.  
Another measure of wealth in adulthood relates to where an individual resides as an adult.  
Does a grown adult remain in her parents’ home, in a rented home, or in an owned home?  Typically 
living in a home apart from parents is desirable after a certain age, especially for married couples, 
but this is not always economically feasible. Baseline values among the untreated show 46.8% living 
in the parents’ home, 23.8% living in a rented home, and 29.4 living in a home owned by the 
individual or jointly owned with a spouse.  Table 12 shows multinomial logit estimations indicating 
that formerly sponsored individuals are much less likely to remain living in their parents’ home.  
There is some indication that women are more likely to live in an owned home, but marginal effects 
are insignificant. Instead of living in their parents’ home as adults at the time of the survey, 
sponsored individuals are 4.8 percentage points more likely to live in a home rented themselves, 
about two percentage point higher for men than for women. 
4. Conclusion 
International child sponsorship is a leading form of individual contact and financial assistance 
between ordinary people in developed countries and the poor in developing countries, yet little has 
been known about the impact of these programs on the economic outcomes in adulthood of 
sponsored children. Our more conservative Heckman estimates from a six-country study of 10,144 
individuals show that child sponsorship is responsible for increases in monthly income of about $15 
over an unconditional baseline of $75, or an increase of approximately 20%.  This effect of child 
sponsorship on future labor income is due principally to sponsored children entering the labor 
market as adults who would not have done so otherwise, particularly for women.   We find that men 
15 
 
realize an added $6.74 of monthly income from higher wages conditional upon employment, but 
that estimations on the impact on wages of women cannot reject a null hypothesis of zero.13   
Given that the cost of sponsorship to sponsors was $28 per month during the time in the 
1980s and 1990s when the individuals in our study were sponsored, and that the average length of 
sponsorship was 9.3 years, a monthly income increase of a little over $15 over an average lifetime of 
work implies a modest financial rate of return to child sponsorship of 4.5%.  Note that this 
calculation omits both the opportunity cost of children’s time in the program and other non-
pecuniary returns to education in adulthood.  Because the latter is likely to exceed the former, this 
return almost certainly represents a lower bound on the rate of return to child sponsorship. 
Our estimations of impacts on wealth in adulthood find significant impacts on adult dwelling 
quality from child sponsorship on proxies for adult wealth, where we find that sponsored children—
especially males--are more likely as adults to live in better housing, homes with electricity, and with 
roof and floor made of superior construction. Formerly sponsored men are more likely to live in 
homes with indoor plumbing.  Impacts on adult consumer good ownership, however, are more 
modest and appear to be limited to substantially greater ownership of mobile phones among both 
formerly sponsored men and women.  We also present (modest) evidence suggesting that sponsored 
children have fewer children, along with stronger evidence that both formerly sponsored men and 
women are less likely to live with their parents in adulthood. 
What about child sponsorship, in particular Compassion’s approach to child sponsorship, 
could be responsible for these significant effects on income and wealth in adulthood?  In related 
research using a separate sample of currently sponsored children we explore the hypothesis that child 
sponsorship may improve adult incomes not merely through relieving external constraints that 
improve schooling access, nutrition, and health, but through addressing internal constraints related 
to imparting a greater level of hopefulness about the future and instilling greater aspirations for 
schooling and adult vocation.  Using data on currently sponsored children, we find in Glewwe, 
Ross, and Wydick (2014) a causal link between child sponsorship and elevated educational and 
vocational aspirations among children in Kenya, and higher levels of happiness, self-efficacy, and 
                                                          
13 As pointed out by a referee, income increases due to increased labor market participation do not account for the 
implicit cost of reduced leisure time, and since at the margin those two uses of time should be approximately equal the 
net benefit of child sponsorship via increased labor market participation may be close to zero.  However, this ignores the 
fact that sponsorship can have a variety of non-economic effects that make leisure time more valuable, such as improved 
health and overall greater psychological well-being.  While we cannot estimate those effects with our data, they are 
likely to be positive, and so even if all of the increased income is due solely to increased labor force participation the net 
benefit of the program is unlikely to be zero. In addition, some of our estimates in Tables 3, 4 and 6 find positive impacts 
on wages from sponsorship, and these can serve as a lower bound of the “net” impact of sponsorship on income.     
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hopefulness based on a quantitative analysis of children’s self-portrait drawings in Indonesia.  
Although it is yet impossible to definitively identify these increased aspirations as a causal channel 
to the positive impact from sponsorship on income and wealth we find in this study, what is clear 
from our three pieces of research on child sponsorship is that child sponsorship increases aspirations 
and that child sponsorship also improves adult economic outcomes.  We present a diagram in 
Figure 9 of what appears to us to be the causal channel for the effects we observe from child 
sponsorship on income and wealth in adulthood. 
Most conditional and unconditional cash transfer programs, and many – if not most –   
educational interventions, do not seek to directly address internal constraints of children, which are 
also related to the fostering of non-cognitive (socio-emotional) skills.  Our findings on the impacts 
of child sponsorship suggest that this may constitute a missed opportunity.  Taken together, our 
results suggest that development interventions that relieve tangible external constraints, while 
simultaneously addressing the internal constraints faced by the poor, may realize stronger impacts 
than those that address external constraints alone, thus providing a basis for experimenting with 
new programs that embody these joint characteristics and for important future research. 
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  Figure 1: Sponsorship as a Function of Age When Program Started 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Differences in Log Income, Sponsored vs. Unsponsored 
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Figure 3: Monthly Income as a Function of Eligibility  
 
 
 
Figure 4: Growth in Labor Income Gap Over Time, Sponsored vs. Non-Sponsored  
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Figure 5:  Impact on Labor Income between Sponsored and Non-Sponsored 
 by Mother’s Education (Bandwidth = 0.5) 
 
 
Figure 6: Kernel Density of Number of Children by Sponsorship Status 
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Figure 7: Probability of Marriage by Sponsorship, Sex, and Age  
 
 
Figure 8: Number of Children in Adulthood by Age 
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Figure 9:  Plausible Chain of Causal Effects from Sponsorship 
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      Table 1: Years of Sponsorship in Program by Country: 
 
 
Mean        Std. Dev.    Frequency 
Uganda 11.02 3.53 188 
Guatemala   6.64 2.55 357 
Philippines   7.12 4.79 237 
India 10.86 3.53 221 
Kenya 10.13 3.43 543 
Bolivia   9.48 3.78 288 
Total   9.30 3.93     1,834 
                      (Note: weighted mean is presented) 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Variable Full Sample Sponsored Unsponsored Difference p-value 
Age 29.82  26.51 30.56 4.05 0.000 
Sex 0.504 0.481 0.509 -0.028 0.013 
Birth Order 3.041 3.006 3.049 -0.043 0.389 
Mothers Educ. (Years) 4.85 4.94  4.83 0.11  0.298 
Uganda 0.080 0.102 0.075 0.027 0.001 
Guatemala 0.167 0.192 0.162 0.030 0.002 
Philippines 0.141 0.129 0.143 -0.014 0.122 
India 0.159 0.119 0.168 -0.049 0.000 
Kenya 0.304 0.296 0.306 -0.010 0.418 
Bolivia 0.145 0.158 0.142 0.016 0.089 
Working = 1 0.491 0.545 .479 0.066 0.000 
Monthly Income 
($US) 
77.96 91.53 74.86 16.67 0.008 
Monthly Income 
($US), Working=1 
198.13 194.25 199.24 -4.99 0.649 
Monthly Income 
(Imputed, $US) 
90.63 104.13 87.62 16.51 0.000 
Monthly Income 
(Imp, $US), Working=1 
170.25 177.48 168.43 9.05 0.009 
Housing Quality  
Index (Simple) 
2.81 2.88 2.80 0.08 0.0143 
Consumer Good Index 
(Simple) 
1.26 1.25 1.27 -0.02 0.378 
Sample Size  10,011 1,819 8,192   
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Table 3: Impact on Monthly Labor Income: Heckman Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Heckman 
Misg. Omt. 
No FE 
Heckman 
Misg. Omt. 
HH FE 
Heckman 
Obs. Impt. 
HH FE 
IV-Heckman 
Misg. Omt. 
No FE 
IV-Heckman 
Misg. Omt. 
HH FE 
IV-Heckman 
Obs. Impt. 
HH FE 
Heckman 
Selection 
   =
𝜕Φ(𝑧′𝛾)
𝜕𝑇
 
0.096*** 
(0.017) 
0.079*** 
(0.0155) 
0.068*** 
(0.014) 
0.116* 
(0.066) 
0.191** 
(0.090) 
0.186** 
(0.080) 
       
Selection Impact 
on Income 
=
𝜕Φ(𝑧′𝛾)
𝜕𝑇
∙ 𝑤(?̅?′𝛽) 
$17.25*** 
(3.12) 
 
$15.63*** 
(3.08) 
$12.81*** 
(2.71) 
$23.65* 
(13.22) 
 
$38.00** 
(17.76) 
$35.31** 
(15.33) 
       
Marginal  wage 
Impact | w > 0 
         =
𝜕𝑤
𝜕𝑇
 
-$1.17 
(9.85) 
-$5.39 
(10.79) 
$6.06** 
(3.10) 
$40.16 
(50.05) 
$48.99 
(50.79) 
$10.23 
(15.21) 
Marginal  wage 
Impact on Income 
      =
𝜕𝑤
𝜕𝑇
∙ Φ(𝑧′̅𝛾) 
-$0.46 
(4.02) 
-$2.12 
(4.25) 
$2.64* 
(1.38) 
$15.80 
(23.84) 
$19.28 
(19.76) 
$4.46 
(6.69) 
Lambda 
 
-18.85*** 
(3.94) 
-56.12 
(41.19) 
-10.55*** 
(3.60) 
-19.37** 
(8.03) 
-57.80 
(52.76) 
-10.31 
(7.50) 
Observations 8,389 8,389 10,004 8,389 8,389 10,004 
Mean w, untreated $74.86 
(196.07) 
$74.86 
(196.07) 
$74.86 
(196.07) 
$74.86 
(196.07) 
$74.86 
(196.07) 
$74.86 
(196.07) 
Mean w | w > 0, 
untreated 
$199.24 
(278.47) 
$199.24 
(278.47) 
$199.24 
(278.47) 
$199.24 
(278.47) 
$199.24 
(278.47) 
$199.24 
(278.47) 
 
    BY COUNTRY: (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Selection Impact 
on Income 
=
𝜕Φ(𝑧′𝛾)
𝜕𝑇
∙ 𝑤(?̅?′𝛽) 
Col. (3) OLS  
HH FE 
Uganda 
Col. (3) OLS 
HH FE 
Guatemala  
Col. (3) OLS 
HH FE 
Philippines  
Col. (3) OLS 
HH FE 
India  
Col. (3) OLS 
HH FE 
Kenya  
Col. (3) OLS  
HH FE 
Bolivia 
Sponsored $7.19 $27.63** $17.01* $37.61*** $1.61 $8.19 
 (7.82) (8.35) (9.54) (6.47) (3.57) (6.09) 
Observations 809 1,680 1,407 1,599 3,051 1,458 
Mean w, untreated $36.90    
144.30 
 $56.65    
104.66 
 $115.33    
253.02 
 $131.96    
167.22  
$31.22    
89.62 
 $57.73    
120.46 
Mean w | w > 0, 
untreated 
$154.99   
264.39 
 $193.34     
104.68 
$301.78     
333.85 
$198.28    
169.90 
$111.62    
140.65 
$165.36     
154.36 
Heckman estimations include controls for age, gender, sibling order, and oldest sibling.  Selection on 
Impact multiplies marginal effect of first-stage tobit by E[w | w > 0] for sample ($178.07).   First-stage 
F-test for instrumental variable estimation yields F = 225.5 (p < 0.001).  Hausman test for efficiency of 
Heckman vs. IV Heckman fails to reject null of non-instrumented Heckman efficiency (p = 0.1363). 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Impact on Monthly Labor Income by Gender: Heckman Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Heckman 
All Obs Imp. 
HH FE  
Men 
IV-Heckman 
Misg. Omt. 
No FE 
Men 
IV-Heckman 
Misg. Omt. 
HH FE 
Men 
 Heckman 
All Obs Imp. 
HH FE  
Women 
IV-Heckman 
Misg. Omt. 
No FE 
Women 
IV-Heckman 
Misg. Omt. 
HH FE 
Women 
Heckman 
Selection 
   =
𝜕Φ(𝑧′𝛾)
𝜕𝑇
 
0.063*** 
(0.023) 
0.104 
(0.134) 
0.258 
(0.205) 
 0.073*** 
(0.022) 
0.093 
(0.071) 
0.138 
(0.106) 
        
Selection Impact 
on Income 
=
𝜕Φ(𝑧′𝛾)
𝜕𝑇
∙ 𝑤(?̅?′𝛽) 
$12.60*** 
(4.44) 
$22.03 
(27.60) 
$51.78 
(41.95) 
 $12.75*** 
(3.90) 
$18.07 
(13.50) 
$26.50 
(20.01) 
        
Marginal  wage 
Impact | w > 0 
         =
𝜕𝑤
𝜕𝑇
 
$12.90*** 
(4.14) 
$69.44 
(83.70) 
$111.18 
(87.69) 
 $0.43 
(4.62) 
-$3.77 
(72.58) 
$20.97 
(54.89) 
Marginal  wage 
Impact on Income 
      =
𝜕𝑤
𝜕𝑇
∙ Φ(𝑧′̅𝛾) 
$6.74*** 
(2.21) 
$33.16 
(41.36) 
$53.08 
(41.57) 
 $0.15 
(1.65) 
-$1.16 
(21.35) 
$6.48 
(16.72) 
Lambda 
 
-5.41*** 
(1.71) 
-13.48*** 
(4.95) 
-109.50 
(24.79) 
 -35.9*** 
(6.19) 
-27.05 
(50.32) 
-42.37 
(101.1) 
Observations 5,048 4,197 4,197  4,956 4,192 4,956 
Mean w, untreated $100.70 
(185.69) 
$96.98 
(195.92) 
$96.98 
(195.92) 
 $47.54 
(114.82) 
$58.83 
(183.47) 
$58.83 
(183.47) 
Mean w | w > 0, 
untreated 
$201.89 
(220.71) 
$203.12 
(242.57) 
$203.12 
(242.57) 
 $175.02 
(162.01) 
$190.29 
(289.65) 
$190.29 
(289.65) 
Heckman estimations include controls for age, gender, sibling order, and oldest sibling.  Selection on Impact 
multiplies marginal effect of first-stage tobit by E[w | w > 0] for sample by gender. First-stage F-tests for 
instrumental variable estimation yields F = 110, 116, respectively  for Men and Women (p < 0.001).  *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Schooling Impacts on Labor Market Participation and Number of Children  
 
---- Labor Market Participation ----   --------- Number of Children ----------    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES All Men Women All Men Women 
 OLS, Household Fixed Effects Negative Binomial Regression 
Schooling 0.023*** 0.014*** 0.032*** -0.074*** -0.054*** -0.094*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
Observations 8,348 4,180 4,168 9,955 5,025 4,930 
R-squared 0.045 0.034 0.032 0.303 0.298 0.303 
       
Regressions include controls for age, gender, and sibling order.  OLS estimations incorporate household 
fixed effects, but negative binomial regressions do not incorporate household fixed effects due to integer 
constraints.  Alphas are significant at p < 0.01 in all negative binomial estimations. Clustered standard 
errors at the household level are in parentheses.   
 *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Table 6: Estimated Program Impact on Income via Labor Market Effects from Added Schooling 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES OLS  
Fixed Effects 
IV  
Fixed Effects 
Men: OLS  
Fixed Effects 
Men: IV  
Fixed Effects 
Women: OLS  
Fixed Effects 
Women: IV  
Fixed Effects 
Dep. Variable: Years of Schoolinga       
Sponsored 1.11*** 1.45*** 1.14*** 2.00*** 1.09*** 0.695 
 (1.21) (0.406) (1.38) (5.16) (0.145) (0.487) 
R-squared 0.063 0.047 0.056 0.042 0.076 0.072 
       
Income Impact of Program via 
Schooling Effect on Labor Market 
Participationb: 
OLS  Probit 
 Avg. Wage 
Fixed Effects 
IV  Probit 
 Avg. Wage 
Fixed Effects 
Men: OLS  
Probit  Avg. 
Wage, FE 
Men: IV   
Probit  Avg. 
Wage, FE 
Women: OLS  
Probit  Avg. 
Wage, FE 
Women: IV   
Probit  Avg. 
Wage, FE 
 $5.03*** $6.56** $3.54*** $6.21* $6.01*** $3.83 
 (0.743) (2.83) (0.902) (3.36) (1.09) (3.38) 
       
Income Impact of Program via 
Schooling Effect on Labor Market 
Wagec: 
OLS  
Heckman  
Prob(Emp.) 
Fixed Effects 
IV   
Heckman  
Prob(Emp.)  
Fixed Effects 
Men: OLS  
Heckman 
Prob(Emp.)  
Fixed Effects 
Men: IV   
Heckman  
Prob(Emp.)  
Fixed Effects 
Women: OLS 
 Heckman  
Prob(Emp.) 
Fixed Effects 
Women: IV   
Heckman  
Prob(Emp.)  
Fixed Effects 
Years of Schooling $3.01* $3.92** $2.36* $4.11 $8.37* $5.33 
 (1.75) (2.13) (1.44) (2.80) (4.62) (5.08) 
Heckman’s Lambda -5.62** -5.62** 11.66 11.66 -0.90*** -0.90*** 
 (2.44) (2.44) (7.55) (7.55) (0.24) (0.24) 
       
Observations 8,348 8,348 4,180 4,180 4,168 4,168 
       
Sponsorship Impact via Schooling       
 Earnings from Employment + $8.04 $10.48 $5.90 $10.32 $14.38 $9.16 
 Earnings from Marginal Wage       
a
OLS and Instrumental Variables estimates include controls for age, gender, sibling order, oldest sibling and household-level fixed 
effects. First-stage F-tests for instrumental variable estimation yields F = 225.5 (all), 111.0 (Men), 116.7 (Women) respectively (p < 
0.001).   
b
Reported coefficients stem from product of (sponsorship program impact on schooling)  (schooling impact on labor market 
participation)  (Mean Labor Market Wage).  Joint estimates and include controls for age, gender, sibling order, oldest sibling and 
household-level fixed effects.  Coefficients are estimated jointly; bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the household level 
(500 replications).   
c
Reported coefficients stem from product of (sponsorship program impact on schooling)  (schooling impact on marginal wage, 
conditional on employment )  (Probability of Employment).  Joint estimates and include controls for age, gender, sibling order, 
oldest sibling and household-level fixed effects.  Coefficients are estimated jointly; bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the 
household level (500 replications).   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7: Sponsorship Impacts on Marriage and Number of Children  
 
              --------------Prob. Married-----------     ---------- Number of Children ------------    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES LP Model 
HH FE 
LP w/ FE, 
Interact. 
GMM-IV FE 
w/ Interact. 
NegBinomial NegBinomial 
w/ Interact. 
Neg-Bin-IV 
w/ Interact. 
OLS, Household FE:       
Sponsored -0.029* -0.038 -1.431 -0.018 0.157 1.074** 
 (0.016) (0.094) (1.085) (0.038) (0.230) (0.422) 
Sponsored + (Spon x Age 17-21)  -0.042 -0.032    
  (0.045) (0.045)    
Sponsored + (Spon x Age 22-27)  0.001 -0.012  -0.077 0.580*** 
  (0.022) (0.023)  (0.065) (0.199) 
Sponsored + (Spon x Age 28-33)  -0.012 -0.030  -0.010 0.562*** 
  (0.024) (0.027)  (0.047) (0.175) 
Sponsored + (Spon x Age 34-39)  -0.021 -0.077  0.005 0.292 
  (0.041) (0.058)  (0.085) (0.191) 
Sponsored + (Spon x Age 40-45)     -0.256* -0.265 
     (0.145) (0.307) 
Intra-Household Spillovers  
(α1-α2) - (γ1-γ2) 
-0.041 -0.029 -0.001 -0.152** -0.152*** -0.388*** 
(0.039) (0.039) (0.043) (0.069) (0.065) (0.105) 
Program Impact    
with household Spillovers:  
τ +(α1-α2) - (γ1-γ2) 
-0.071* -0.067 -1.430 -0.170*** 0.005 0.685* 
(0.039) (0.101) (1.608) (0.068) (0.240) (0.410) 
       
τ +(α1-α2) - (γ1-γ2)+(Spon x Age 17-21)  -0.071 -0.031    
  (0.059) (0.064)    
τ +(α1-α2) - (γ1-γ2)+(Spon x Age 22-27)  -0.027 -0.011  -0.229*** 0.191 
  (0.044) (0.047)  (0.087) (0.157) 
τ +(α1-α2) - (γ1-γ2)+(Spon x Age 28-33)  -0.041 -0.029  -0.162** 0.174 
  (0.042) (0.043)  (0.074) (0.119) 
τ +(α1-α2) - (γ1-γ2)+(Spon x Age 34-39)  -0.050 -0.077  -0.146 -0.095 
  (0.056) (0.061)  (0.101) (0.143) 
τ +(α1-α2) - (γ1-γ2)+(Spon x Age 40-45)     -0.407*** -0.653*** 
     (0.156) (0.264) 
       
Observations 10,001 10,001 10,001 10,004 10,004 10,004 
R-squared 0.108 0.144 0.125    
 
Regressions include controls for age, gender, and sibling order.  OLS and IV estimations incorporate household fixed effects.  
Negative binomial regressions display coefficients (not marginal effects) and omit household fixed effects with alpha 
significant at 1% in all regressions (rejecting null of Poisson distribution).   Impacts on “Sponsored + (Spon x Age Group)” 
are the sum of coefficients on Sponsored added to the coefficient of Sponsored x Age Group and joint tests of these two 
coefficients.  GMM-IV estimations instrument for schooling using sponsorship program.  First-stage instrumental variable 
estimations yield F = 297.12.  Clustered standard errors at the household level in parentheses.    
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
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Table 8: Impacts on Adult Vocation by Gender: Marginal Effects, Multinomial Logit Estimations 
Men 
Occupational 
Category 
MN Logit 
Coefficients 
Marginal 
Effects 
Baseline 
Untreated 
Occupational 
Category 
MN Logit 
Coefficients 
Marginal 
Effects 
Baseline 
Untreated 
1 Agriculture 0.042 0.0068 0.048 8 Small Business 0.053 -0.0052 0.045 
(0.23) (0.011)  (0.25) (0.0105)  
2 Construction, 
Day Labor 
0.497** 0.012 0.046 9 Ministry, 
Pastoral 
0.477 0.0026 0.0043 
(0.256) (0.0089)  (0.484) (0.0041)  
3 Clerical, Sales 0.290 0.0050 0.047 10 Finance and 
Large Business 
0.329 0.0045 0.027 
 (0.249) (0.009)  (0.287) (0.0078)  
4 Blue Collar 0.349** 0.019 0.104 11 Police, Army, 
Security, Fire 
0.471 0.0056 0.022 
(0.166) (0.015)  (0.350) (0.0064)  
5 Personal 
Services 
0.390* 0.012 0.063 12 Professional, 
Doctor, Lawyer  
0.059 -0.0025 0.024 
(0.216) (0.011)  (0.331) (0.0072)  
6 Teaching 0.920*** 0.0274*** 0.043 13 Semi-skill Tech, 
Call Centers 
0.618** 0.012* 0.027 
(0.233) (0.0079)  (0.288) (0.0071)  
7 Government 0.831 0.0044 0.0078 14 Nursing, Health, 
Hospital  
-0.500 -0.0026 0.0043 
(0.506) (0.0033)  (0.83) (0.0032)  
 
Women 
Occupational 
Category 
MN Logit 
Coefficients 
Marginal 
Effects 
Baseline 
Untreated 
Occupational 
Category 
MN Logit 
Coefficients 
Marginal 
Effects 
Baseline 
Untreated 
1 Agriculture -0.393 -0.021** 0.042 8 Small Business -0.234 -0.012 0.028 
(0.26) (0.010)  (0.277) (0.0091)  
2 Construction, 
Day Labor 
1.180* 0.0036* 0.0049 9 Ministry, 
Pastoral 
0.361 0.0004 0.0012 
(0.657) (0.0021)  (1.12) (0.0018)  
3 Clerical, Sales 0.637*** 0.025*** 0.045 10 Finance and 
Large Business 
0.721** 0.012** 0.020 
 (0.210) (0.0094)  (0.31) (0.0060)  
4 Blue Collar 0.530** 0.0127* 0.027 11 Police, Army, 
Security, Fire 
-0.617 -0.0027 0.0041 
(0.265) (0.0076)  (0.844) (0.0031)  
5 Personal  
Services 
0.578 0.013* 0.025 12 Professional, 
Doctor, Lawyer  
-0.760 -0.011 0.0098 
(0.268) (0.0073)  (0.488) (0.0040)  
6 Teaching 0.371 0.018 0.063 13 Semi-skill Tech, 
Call Centers 
1.199*** 0.011*** 0.0074 
(0.181) (0.011)  (0.387) (0.0037)  
7 Government 0.671 0.0022 0.0045 14 Nursing, Health, 
Hospital  
0.955*** 0.014*** 0.015 
(0.641) (0.0025)  (0.33) (0.0051)  
        
Estimations include fixed effects at the household level.  Marginal effects, dy/dx, are from corresponding multinomial logit 
estimations; control variables are gender, age, age
2
, birth order, and oldest child.  Number of observations = 4,956. Psuedo 
R
2
 = 0.0165, Chi-squared p < 0.0001. 
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Table 9: Impact on Adult Wealth 
 
--------------------------------Dwelling Quality --------------------------------- 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Indoor 
toilet 
Electricity 
in home 
Improved 
walls 
Improved 
roof 
Improved 
floor 
Simple 
Dwelling 
Index 
Anderson 
Dwelling 
Index 
OLS, Household FE:        
Sponsored 0.009 0.029*** 0.025** 0.004 0.019** 0.082*** 0.034* 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.006) (0.009) (0.017) (0.020) 
Observations 9,477 9,490 7,863 8,554 8,614 10,004 10,004 
R-squared 0.006 0.008 0.011 0.004 0.012 0.013 0.009 
        
GMM-IV, Household FE:        
Sponsored -0.017 0.041 0.006 -0.001 0.070 0.232** 0.192* 
 (0.028) (0.035) (0.049) (0.030) (0.049) (0.093) (0.106) 
Observations 9,477 9,490 7,863 8,554 8,614 10,004 10,004 
 
-------------------------------- Consumer Durables --------------------------------- 
 
 (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
VARIABLES Mobile 
phone 
Owns 
bike 
Owns 
motorcycle 
Owns 
car 
Owns 
land 
Simple 
Consumer 
Index 
Anderson 
Consumer 
Index 
OLS, Household FE:        
Sponsored 0.054*** 0.015 0.010 -0.000 0.003 0.089*** 0.003 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.025) (0.029) 
Observations 9,884 9,856 9,906 9,880 9,444 10,004 10,004 
R-squared 0.047 0.044 0.036 0.023 0.047 0.097 0.047 
        
GMM-IV, Household FE:        
Sponsored 0.183*** 0.004 0.019 0.000 -0.006 -0.004 0.024 
 (0.055) (0.052) (0.040) (0.036) (0.046) (0.128) (0.145) 
Observations 9,883 9,856 9,906 9,880 9,444 10,004 10,004 
R-squared 0.085 0.060 0.106 0.029 0.063 0.149 0.077 
Regressions include controls for age, gender, and sibling order.  OLS and IV estimations incorporate household 
fixed effects. ).  First-stage F-test for instrumental variable estimation yields F = 95.82 (p < 0.001).  Clustered 
standard errors at the household level in parentheses. 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Whenever one of the components is missing for the particular house characteristic, we replace it with the mean for the 
index variables.  This was done due to concern that creating an index only for individuals that had none of the constituent 
categories missing would lead to a non-representative sample.  The “improved walls” variable, which is mildly significant, has the 
most missing observations .  Dropping that variable slightly lowers the estimated impact of the index variables. 
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Table 10: Impact on Adult Wealth, Formerly Sponsored Men 
 
--------------------------------Dwelling Quality --------------------------------- 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES indoor 
toilet 
electricity 
in home 
improved 
walls 
improved 
roof 
improved 
floor 
Simple 
Dwelling 
Index 
Anderson 
Dwelling 
Index 
OLS, Household FE:        
Sponsored 0.021** 0.030** 0.019 0.014* 0.045*** 0.114*** 0.081*** 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.018) (0.008) (0.015) (0.029) (0.031) 
Observations 4,829 4,833 4,007 4,377 4,413 5,048 5,048 
R-squared 0.009 0.008 0.011 0.010 0.017 0.024 0.013 
        
GMM-IV, Household FE:        
Sponsored -0.043 0.079 -0.076 -0.066 0.111 0.132 0.047 
 (0.039) (0.053) (0.063) (0.048) (0.084) (0.133) (0.149) 
Observations 4,829 4,833 4,007 4,377 4,413 5,048 5,048 
 
-------------------------------- Consumer Durables --------------------------------- 
 
 (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
VARIABLES mobile 
phone 
owns 
bike 
owns 
motorcycle 
owns 
car 
owns 
land 
Simple 
Consumer 
Index 
Anderson 
Consumer 
Index 
OLS, Household FE:        
Sponsored 0.073*** 0.015 0.012 -0.000 -0.010 0.094** -0.018 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.043) (0.050) 
Observations 4,986 4,971 4,993 4,979 4,806 5,048 5,048 
R-squared 0.039 0.008 0.018 0.025 0.066 0.067 0.038 
        
GMM-IV, Household FE:        
Sponsored -0.048 -0.005 -0.029 0.031 -0.068 -0.154 -0.007 
 (0.098) (0.090) (0.062) (0.060) (0.069) (0.202) (0.231) 
Observations 9,883 9,856 9,906 9,880 9,444 10,004 10,004 
Regressions include controls for age, gender, and sibling order.  OLS and IV estimations incorporate household 
fixed effects. ).  First-stage F-test for instrumental variable estimation yields F = 76.48 (p < 0.001).  Clustered 
standard errors at the household level in parentheses. 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 11: Impact on Adult Wealth, Formerly Sponsored Women 
 
--------------------------------Dwelling Quality --------------------------------- 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES indoor 
toilet 
electricity 
in home 
improved 
walls 
improved 
roof 
improved 
floor 
Simple 
Dwelling 
Index 
Anderson 
Dwelling 
Index 
OLS, Household FE:        
Sponsored 0.008 0.029** 0.026 -0.001 0.009 0.052* -0.002 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.019) (0.009) (0.016) (0.030) (0.030) 
Observations 4,648 4,657 3,856 4,177 4,201 4,956 4,956 
R-squared 0.010 0.007 0.010 0.014 0.014 0.006 0.010 
        
GMM-IV, Household FE:        
Sponsored -0.020 -0.007 0.034 0.011 0.004 0.122 0.166 
 (0.025) (0.028) (0.049) (0.028) (0.047) (0.091) (0.107) 
Observations 4,648 4,657 3,856 4,177 4,201 4,956 4,956 
 
-------------------------------- Consumer Durables --------------------------------- 
 
 (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
VARIABLES mobile 
phone 
owns 
bike 
owns 
motorcycle 
owns 
car 
owns 
land 
Simple 
Consumer 
Index 
Anderson 
Consumer 
Index 
OLS, Household FE:        
Sponsored 0.058*** 0.012 0.018 0.003 0.006 0.107*** 0.029 
 (0.018) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.035) (0.041) 
Observations 4,898 4,885 4,913 4,901 4,638 4,956 4,956 
R-squared 0.040 0.005 0.005 0.025 0.057 0.053 0.027 
        
GMM-IV, Household FE:        
Sponsored 0.103 0.002 0.050 -0.011 0.021 0.143 0.031 
 (0.065) (0.044) (0.042) (0.035) (0.048) (0.129) (0.145) 
Observations 4,898 4,885 4,913 4,901 4,638 4,956 4,956 
Regressions include controls for age, gender, and sibling order.  OLS and IV estimations incorporate household 
fixed effects. ).  First-stage F-test for instrumental variable estimation yields F = 78.88 (p < 0.001).  Clustered 
standard errors at the household level in parentheses.   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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     Table 12:  Impacts on Home Residence 
Multinomial Logit Estimations 
(Base Category: Living in Parent’s Home) 
 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 All individuals  Men  Women 
VARIABLES Live in 
Rented 
Home 
Live in 
Owned 
Home 
 Live in 
Rented 
Home 
Live in 
Owned 
Home 
 Live in 
Rented 
Home 
Live in 
Owned 
Home 
         
Multinomial Logit Coeffs: 0.362*** 0.161*  0.382*** 0.089  0.318*** 0.211* 
Sponsored (0.085) (0.088)  (0.118) (0.128)  (0.121) (0.121) 
         
Marginal Effects:         
Sponsored 0.048*** 0.00  0.057*** -0.011  0.035** 0.011 
 (0.013) (0.13)  0.019 (0.019)  (0.017) (0.018) 
Observations 8,365  4,288  4,077 
Pseudo R-squared 0.170  0.166  0.181 
Multinomial logit estimations include controls for age, gender, oldest child, sibling order, number of siblings, 
mother’s education, father’s education and country fixed effects.  Data on residence not obtained in Uganda. 
Baseline values among untreated: 46.8% living in parent’s home, 23.8% living in rented home, 29.4 living in 
an owned home.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
 
 
